Phone Servers Are Taking Orders by Text Message

FreeSWITCH flaw CVE-2026-116779 lets an accepted SIP chat message run server commands; here's how to check and patch your clients' phone servers.

A single SIP chat message, the text-message cousin of a phone call, can make an unpatched FreeSWITCH phone server run the sender's commands once the server accepts it. On 9 November 2026, CISA added CVE-2026-116779 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and gave US federal agencies until 12 November to fix it. Check every client's phone system today, starting with boxes a contractor installed and then left alone.

TL;DR

  • SignalWire FreeSWITCH flaw CVE-2026-116779 is exploited in the wild; CISA added it to KEV on 9 November 2026.
  • Your clients are exposed if they run FreeSWITCH 1.11.2 or earlier with inbound SIP chat on, which SignalWire's advisory says is the stock default. fs_cli -x 'version' shows the build.
  • Upgrade to FreeSWITCH 1.11.3; until then, set enable-chat to false and delete directory users without passwords, then hunt for footholds.
  • An accepted message can run commands with FreeSWITCH's privileges and expose configuration and credentials, according to SignalWire.

What is CVE-2026-116779 and is it being exploited?

CVE-2026-116779 is a code-injection FreeSWITCH vulnerability: on a VoIP server (internet phone system) running SignalWire's open-source FreeSWITCH, an inbound SIP MESSAGE (a chat request sent over SIP, the protocol that sets up calls) can steer FreeSWITCH into running its own API commands. SignalWire's 28 October advisory says exploitation "has been observed in the wild", and CISA added it to KEV on 9 November 2026 with a 12 November due date.

NVD lists 9.8 out of 10; the score assumes no login because the stock default directory user has no password, and otherwise any valid profile account is enough, per SignalWire. Neither SecurityWeek nor The Hacker News reports a public exploit or a count of exposed servers.

Which FreeSWITCH versions are affected?

FreeSWITCH 1.11.2 and earlier are affected, and FreeSWITCH 1.11.3 is the fixed release, per SignalWire's advisory. The fix adds a per-profile enable-chat-api-proto setting that stays off unless an admin turns it on. CISA's KEV entry notes the flaw may affect other products that embed FreeSWITCH, so include PBX (office phone system) and contact-centre products built on it. The same KEV batch carried an OpenSSH flaw that also hinges on accounts with no password on Alpine Linux.

How do I check if my clients' FreeSWITCH servers were hit?

SignalWire publishes no indicators of compromise and none of the sources we checked dates the first attack, so these checks look for exposure and footholds; a clean result can't rule out a past break-in whose traces were removed. They need a root shell on the Linux server. For an appliance that embeds FreeSWITCH, open a support case with its vendor quoting CVE-2026-116779.

  1. Preserve evidence. Save the process list, FreeSWITCH config, logs and cron files, then hash them, before changing anything. Pass: $D.sha256 lists the copied files.

    # run checks 1-7 in one shell; later checks reuse $C
    D=/root/ir-freeswitch-$(date +%F); sudo mkdir -p "$D"
    sudo ps -eo pid,ppid,user,comm,args --forest | sudo tee "$D/ps.txt" >/dev/null
    C=$(sudo fs_cli -x 'global_getvar conf_dir'); L=$(sudo fs_cli -x 'global_getvar log_dir')
    # errors for cron paths that don't exist on this distro are expected
    sudo cp -a "$C" "$L" /etc/cron* /var/spool/cron "$D"/
    sudo find "$D" -type f -exec sha256sum {} + | sudo tee "$D.sha256"
    
  2. Read the version. The FreeSWITCH CLI reference documents version and fs_cli -x. Pass: the version line shows 1.11.3 or later.

    sudo fs_cli -x 'version'
    
  3. Check inbound chat. SignalWire's Sofia docs say enable-chat defaults to true, so on 1.11.2 or earlier each listed profile accepts chat. Pass: no output.

    sudo grep -L 'name="enable-chat" value="false"' "$C"/sip_profiles/*.xml
    
  4. Find passwordless directory users. The advisory names stock default and Skinny example users. Pass: no output.

    sudo grep -rlE '<user ' "$C/directory" | xargs -r sudo grep -LE 'name="(password|a1-hash)"'
    # users that inherit a password from their group also show; open each file to confirm
    
  5. Test SIP exposure from outside. sofia status lists each profile's address and port. Pass: nmap reports no SIP port as open from outside.

    sudo fs_cli -x 'sofia status'
    # from a host outside the client's network, using the ports sofia status shows
    sudo nmap -Pn -sU -sT -p U:<sip-port>,T:<sip-port> <client-public-ip>
    
  6. Look for commands FreeSWITCH started. Injected commands run as children of the FreeSWITCH process; this shows only processes still running. Pass: no shell, downloader or script interpreter sits under freeswitch.

    sudo ps -eo pid,ppid,user,comm,args --forest | grep -A5 '[f]reeswitch'
    
  7. Check scheduled tasks. A cron job would let an attacker's command survive a reboot. Pass: the client's admins recognise each entry.

    sudo ls -la /etc/cron* /var/spool/cron/*
    

How do I fix the FreeSWITCH vulnerability on client servers?

  1. Close the door: upgrade. Install FreeSWITCH 1.11.3 the way the server was installed, then restart. Pass: version shows 1.11.3 or later and the grep prints nothing.

    sudo systemctl restart freeswitch
    sudo fs_cli -x 'version'
    sudo grep -rn 'enable-chat-api-proto" value="true' "$C"
    
  2. Temporary, if the upgrade can't go in today. Add <param name="enable-chat" value="false"/> to the settings of the profiles check 3 listed, delete the users check 4 listed, and restart those profiles. SignalWire says disable_system_api_commands=true removes only the system API, so it is not enough. Pass: checks 3 and 4 print nothing.

    sudo fs_cli -x 'reloadxml'
    # restart drops that profile's live calls; add any other profile sofia status lists
    sudo fs_cli -x 'sofia profile internal restart'
    sudo fs_cli -x 'sofia profile external restart'
    
  3. Remove footholds. If check 6 or 7 found anything unexpected, rebuild the server on 1.11.3 and restore only config reviewed against the check 1 copy. Pass: checks 6 and 7 show only expected entries.

  4. Rotate credentials. Change each directory user's password and each gateway (SIP trunk to the carrier) password, at the carrier and in config, then reload. Pass: reprovisioned phones reappear in show registrations and gateways show registered.

    sudo fs_cli -x 'reloadxml'
    sudo fs_cli -x 'show registrations'
    sudo fs_cli -x 'sofia status'
    
  5. Hardening (agree with the client first): limit SIP ports. Allow SIP only from the carrier's and the client's own ranges; softphones outside them will stop registering. Pass: check 5 from an outside address shows no open SIP port.

Where KinoSec fits

KinoSec's autonomous external network pentest checks whether each client's SIP services answer from the internet and, where the service announces it, which phone software and version is running, so a FreeSWITCH box on 1.11.2 or earlier lands in the findings with remediation. That matters most for phone servers a telecoms contractor set up outside the client's patch cycle, much like the factory gateway add-on that bots found first. It doesn't read the server's config or process list; the chat-setting and process checks do that. Autonomous external network pentesting with Poseidon is built to report that class of exposure in a report you can hand each client.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is a FreeSWITCH server safe if it only faces the office network?

No. SignalWire's advisory says inbound chat is on in the stock internal and external profiles, and any valid account on the profile is enough to send an accepted message. A stolen softphone login or a compromised office PC can reach an internal profile.

How do I check if my clients' FreeSWITCH servers were hit?

Run sudo fs_cli -x 'version' and confirm 1.11.3 or later. Run sudo fs_cli -x 'sofia status', then scan those SIP ports with nmap from outside the client's network. Run ps -eo pid,ppid,user,comm,args --forest and look for shells or downloaders under freeswitch; it shows only processes still running.

Does disable_system_api_commands block CVE-2026-116779?

No. SignalWire says disable_system_api_commands=true removes only the system API, so it does not close the path. Until FreeSWITCH 1.11.3 is installed, set enable-chat to false on profiles that don't need SIP chat and remove directory users without a password or a1-hash.

What should clients ask their phone-system provider about CVE-2026-116779?

Ask which FreeSWITCH version the system runs or embeds, whether 1.11.3 is installed, and whether inbound SIP chat is on for any profile. CISA's KEV entry notes the flaw may affect other products that use FreeSWITCH, so hosted and white-label phone platforms are in scope. Ask for the output of fs_cli -x 'version' rather than a yes or no.