Crédit Mutuel Arkéa's cyberattack came through a supplier's platform; here's how to audit provider access in your clients' Active Directory.
Thieves moved money out of a French bank's own account without touching customers' savings, and they came in through a door the bank didn't own. On 4 November 2026, Crédit Mutuel Arkéa said the attackers entered through one of its service providers' platforms and used the bank's own account to send money to other banks. Check every client's list of outside provider accounts, yours included, today.
Crédit Mutuel Arkéa, the group behind Crédit Mutuel de Bretagne, Crédit Mutuel du Sud-Ouest and the online bank Fortuneo, was hit by an attack that let outsiders make fraudulent transfers, the bank announced on 4 November 2026. In its follow-up statement, Arkéa said the attackers came through a service provider's platform, reached the group directly and paid other banks from Arkéa's own account. It says no customer accounts were used, no human error caused the attack and Fortuneo was not the entry point.
Arkéa has not named the provider or the weakness used. It is working with judicial and police authorities to establish both. Le Télégramme's €118 million, per CSO Online, and blockchain investigator ZachXBT's "more than $133 million", per The Record, are roughly the same sum in two currencies. Part of the money has been frozen, the bank says.
For anyone who serves clients, the lesson is the route: a supplier's access led straight into the bank. An MSP, IT contractor or software vendor with a standing login into a client is that kind of supplier.
Arkéa hasn't said how its provider was breached, so these checks cover the access any provider holds in a client's Active Directory (AD, the Windows directory that controls logins) and network. Run them as a domain admin on a machine with Microsoft's AD PowerShell module. Domain controller logs usually cover weeks, not months, so search the client's SIEM or syslog archive back to the oldest retained logs; a clean result on the controllers can't rule out an older break-in.
Preserve evidence. Save every domain controller's Security log and a full account list, then hash them (Get-WinEvent, Get-ADDomainController). Pass: the .sha256.csv file lists one log per controller plus ad-users.csv.
$D = "C:\IR\ad-$(Get-Date -Format yyyyMMdd)"
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $D -Force | Out-Null
Get-ADDomainController -Filter * | ForEach-Object { $h = $_.HostName; Get-WinEvent -ComputerName $h -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Security' } | Export-Clixml "$D\$h-Security.xml" }
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties Description,LastLogonDate,whenCreated,PasswordLastSet | Export-Csv "$D\ad-users.csv" -NoTypeInformation
Get-ChildItem $D -File | Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256 | Export-Csv "$D.sha256.csv" -NoTypeInformation
List enabled accounts whose password never expires (Search-ADAccount). Each one needs a named owner and a reason. Pass: the client names an owner for every row.
Search-ADAccount -PasswordNeverExpires -UsersOnly | Where-Object Enabled | Select-Object Name,SamAccountName,LastLogonDate
List who holds admin rights, including members of nested groups (Get-ADGroupMember). Pass: only named staff and provider accounts the client approved in writing appear.
'Domain Admins','Enterprise Admins','Administrators' | ForEach-Object { $g = $_; Get-ADGroupMember -Identity $g -Recursive | Select-Object @{ n='Group'; e={ $g } },SamAccountName,objectClass }
Find enabled accounts unused for 90 days. Pass: no output.
Search-ADAccount -AccountInactive -TimeSpan 90.00:00:00 -UsersOnly | Where-Object Enabled | Select-Object Name,LastLogonDate
Search the logs for new accounts and admin-group additions: event 4720 (account created) and 4728, 4732 and 4756 (member added to a security group). Pass: every event matches a change in the client's ticket log.
# Controllers with no matching events print nothing; -ErrorAction hides that "no events" error
Get-ADDomainController -Filter * | ForEach-Object { Get-WinEvent -ComputerName $_.HostName -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Security'; Id=4720,4728,4732,4756 } -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object MachineName,TimeCreated,Id,Message }
Map the remote-access ports from outside the client's network, with nmap's port list syntax. Pass: nmap shows open only the ports on the client's approved list.
nmap -p 22,443,3389 <client-public-range>
Agree every change with the client first: an integration that logs in with a disabled or reset account stops working until the provider gets new details.
Disable accounts nobody owns from checks 2 to 4 (Disable-ADAccount). Pass: rerun check 4; it prints nothing.
Disable-ADAccount -Identity <SamAccountName>
Remove unapproved admin members; the cmdlet asks you to confirm each removal (Remove-ADGroupMember). Pass: rerun check 3; only approved names remain.
Remove-ADGroupMember -Identity 'Domain Admins' -Members <SamAccountName>
Reset passwords on the provider accounts that stay (Set-ADAccountPassword), and give the provider the new one by phone, not email. Pass: a test login with the old password fails.
Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity <SamAccountName> -Reset -NewPassword (Read-Host -AsSecureString 'New password')
Close remote-access ports the client didn't approve at its firewall. Pass: rerun check 6; nmap shows those ports as closed or filtered.
Rerun checks 2 to 6. Pass: each check meets its own Pass line.
KinoSec's autonomous external network and Active Directory pentest checks whether each client's remote-access ports and provider accounts can be found and abused from outside, and how far an attacker gets from there. Arkéa's statement shows the pattern: a supplier's platform led straight to the bank. As an MSP, you are a supplier to your clients, so the same test, run with each client's permission and scope limits, shows whether your own access is the weak link. The report lists each finding with remediation you can hand to the client. It can't tell you how Arkéa's supplier was breached, because the bank hasn't said.
Crédit Mutuel Arkéa describes a sophisticated external attack that enabled fraudulent transfers from its own account. None of the four sources we checked (Arkéa's two statements, The Record and CSO Online) mention ransomware, encrypted systems or a ransom demand. The bank says customer savings were not affected and some transfers were only delayed.
Start with accounts whose password never expires: Search-ADAccount -PasswordNeverExpires -UsersOnly. Then list admin rights: Get-ADGroupMember 'Domain Admins' -Recursive. Finally, loop over the domain controllers with Get-ADDomainController -Filter * | ForEach-Object, piping each one into a Get-WinEvent query for events 4720, 4728, 4732 and 4756, and search the client's SIEM for older events.
Give the provider the new password by phone or through a shared password manager, then confirm the integration logs in again. If an account you disabled turns out to be needed, record its owner and purpose in the client's asset list before turning it back on. Don't restore admin rights the client didn't approve just to make the integration work.
Arkéa's statements show a provider's platform was the way into the bank, so each client needs to know what its providers can reach. A useful clause makes each provider list the accounts it holds in the client's systems and accept a regular review of them. It should also require the provider to report a breach of its own platform to the client quickly.