The Infected PC That Waits for Your Technician

ScreenConnect SCKit attacks abuse RMM+ and CVE-2026-84869; here's how to hunt rogue clients on your clients' ScreenConnect endpoints.

Usually the infected PC is the problem. With SCKit, it is the bait. The malware sits on a compromised endpoint and waits for an MSP technician to connect over ConnectWise ScreenConnect, then tries to hand the technician's own machine a file to run. If that trick worked, one routine support session could open a door into every client that technician manages.

TL;DR

  • On November 11, 2026, an operator used ConnectWise ScreenConnect's Run Command to push rogue clients and the SCKit toolkit to at least 288 endpoints across 48 organizations, Huntress found.
  • Your clients are at risk if your ScreenConnect ran an RMM+-family extension, or technician clients older than 26.6.5, which fixes CVE-2026-84869. The initial entry point is still unconfirmed.
  • Disable the extensions ConnectWise lists, update every technician client, and sweep endpoints out-of-band for RelayTrap, TrapWatch and a second ScreenConnect client.
  • SCKit tries to infect the connecting technician, then reuse their session at other clients. Blackpoint Cyber saw no successful spread as of November 13, 2026.

What happened in the ScreenConnect SCKit attacks?

An attacker used ScreenConnect's Run Command on cloud-hosted panels to run commands as SYSTEM on managed endpoints, installing rogue clients and the ScreenConnect SCKit toolkit. Huntress reported that the first wave began around 17:47 UTC on November 11, 2026, and reached all 288 hosts within 90 minutes. A second wave on November 13 hit 205 hosts across 41 organizations from new infrastructure.

How the attacker got in is the open question. Huntress believes the entry point was the third-party RMM+ extension: versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank RMMPlus.AccessKey if an admin never set one, which skipped ScreenConnect logins and MFA. The issue is now tracked as CVE-2026-127063, a default-secret flaw in the extension. Blackpoint found no technical link between those extensions and SCKit itself.

ConnectWise said it disabled five RMM+-family extensions in about 400 cloud partner environments, and that "the presence of an identified extension alone does not establish compromise." Its November 16 update closes the investigation without naming a root cause.

How does SCKit's RelayTrap target technicians?

RelayTrap replaces the endpoint's real ScreenConnect Guest service with a fake one, then tries to push a file to the technician who connects. According to Blackpoint's analysis, a TrapWatch scheduled task compiles RelayTrap.cs on the victim, stops the real Guest service and starts the fake one. About 2.5 seconds after a technician joins, it sends Run-Lateral-Full.bat with a "run" instruction.

That push abuses CVE-2026-84869, rated CVSS 9.9, a client flaw ConnectWise fixed in 26.6.5 on September 8, 2026. BleepingComputer reported that CISA added it to the KEV catalog on September 11. If the payload ran, SCKit would hunt the technician's browsers for .ASPXAUTH session cookies and replay them to send commands to every endpoint that panel controls.

Blackpoint says a patched client queued the transfer but never ran the file. The rogue clients and persistence are real either way. It is the playbook of the espionage crew that hid in BeyondTrust remote support: compromise the tool that already has the keys.

Am I exposed to the ConnectWise ScreenConnect attack?

You are exposed if any of your ScreenConnect instances ever had Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link or RMM+ Password Link installed, or if any technician client is older than 26.6.5. Updating the server or cloud console does not update technician clients, the advisory warns. On-premises partners must disable the extensions themselves: "ConnectWise cannot disable these extensions in on-premises environments on partners' behalf." ConnectWise also urges disabling ITBoost Integration, RepairShopr Integration and Guest Session Starter.

How do I check my clients for SCKit?

Run checks out-of-band (EDR, WinRM), never through ScreenConnect: a session to a trapped host is unsafe, Huntress warns.

  1. Preserve evidence on on-premises servers first, as ConnectWise asks partners to retain Run Command and Toolbox records. This copies App_Data (the session database), hashes the copy and lists files containing the campaign's strings. Cloud partners should request those records from ConnectWise support.
$D = "D:\IR\screenconnect-$(Get-Date -Format yyyyMMdd-HHmm)"
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $D | Out-Null
Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files*\ScreenConnect*\App_Data' -Directory | Copy-Item -Destination "$D" -Recurse
Get-ChildItem "$D" -Recurse -File | Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256 | Export-Csv "$D.sha256.csv" -NoTypeInformation
Select-String -Path "$D\App_Data\*" -Pattern 'mo7sen|sckit|sc\.msi|Exploited|payproofkit|from-ak\.com' -List | Select-Object Path
  1. Sweep endpoints for the indicators Huntress and Blackpoint published: the RelayTrap folder, the TrapWatch task, the RelayTrapLiteAlert Run value, services using the rogue client IDs, the port proxy to 185.241.211.197, Defender exclusions, kit file names and their SHA-256 hashes. Huntress calls hashes weak indicators because the kit is rebuilt per host. One command covers all hosts listed in client-endpoints.txt.
$check = {
  $bad = @('81cc2baa35b798d6084bd078662fa29ff28df02c46c6ccdb2b43bde97d19f781','a1937467fd862916f89342cdd61f55c4bc405fb35b6e1379e27cfbfdba77dcdc','338e37f58043635ebab64ee5fdc919935e55cb146ca97834b358f934e55e88ec','3c7a98f0fdb6235b8076319c74dc1085f7b349b6d750416dd0cadb07d7972ec4','d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9a','94b93c649b0ae0281352da9d01761fa9195ab1e6ac7010af3b9ba1646355eb11','7a9aca9fdd4dcc13fe497cabdb13ca1e5d6a529271c8aa495e5ca1c1c80271ec','4a1dd3cd2ea14368afadf7e9dfdd63b104e3981ef8c85bbb6510919b810af04b','8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06af','d85315bd7602b6f5c13dc0eada2c9cba0892c7cd3b1eb7dacb1bffdd536ceb21','cf50d73fa8117a758093b1344de41cd6a6ccddc645cdda1fa91a9264efe93956','43b7a5e56f9e6c7b74e1ce2b7b5af63f383084625fcc2d3a5985fa1059e2db95','50659748723e906c8b3d3c0386bd4cf692f693a3e23639398c1a14d0c31fed61')
  $dirs = 'C:\Windows\Temp','C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap','C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp'
  [pscustomobject]@{
    Host      = $env:COMPUTERNAME
    RelayTrap = Test-Path 'C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap'
    TrapWatch = [bool](Get-ScheduledTask -TaskName TrapWatch -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
    RunValue  = [bool](Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run' -Name RelayTrapLiteAlert -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
    Rogue     = (Get-CimInstance Win32_Service | Where-Object { $_.PathName -match '2588ef5c15954b10|ed630cc2c873b091|de362a425905bcc4|UpdateConnect' }).Name -join ';'
    PortProxy = (netsh interface portproxy show v4tov4 | Select-String '185\.241\.211\.197') -join ';'
    Exclusion = ((Get-MpPreference).ExclusionProcess -match 'msiexec|powershell') -join ';'
    KitFiles  = (Get-ChildItem $dirs -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object Name -match '^(sc\.msi|sckit-.*|k[0-9a-f]{32}\.ps1|Panel-Lateral.*|Run-Lateral-Full\.bat|runnew\.cmd|ToolboxRelayUploader\.exe)$').FullName -join ';'
    BadHash   = (Get-ChildItem $dirs -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256 | Where-Object Hash -in $bad).Path -join ';'
  }
}
Invoke-Command -ComputerName (Get-Content .\client-endpoints.txt) -ScriptBlock $check | Export-Csv sckit-sweep.csv -NoTypeInformation
  1. Check technician workstations for the client version and for kit files. Every version listed should be 26.6.5.9742 or later (Blackpoint's fixed build), and the second command should print nothing.
Get-ChildItem 'C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Apps\2.0','C:\Program Files*\ScreenConnect*' -Recurse -Filter 'ScreenConnect*.exe' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { '{0}  {1}' -f $_.VersionInfo.FileVersion, $_.FullName }
Get-ChildItem 'C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp' -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object Name -match '^(Run-Lateral-Full\.bat|runnew\.cmd|Panel-Lateral.*|sqlite3\.exe)$' | Select-Object FullName

How do I fix it?

  1. Preserve evidence first: run checks 1 and 2, and keep the $D copy and sckit-sweep.csv before removing anything.
  2. Disable the eight extensions on the Extensions tab of the ScreenConnect Administration page, and do not re-enable them. Pass: each one shows as disabled.
  3. Update on-premises servers and reinstall technician host clients as ConnectWise's 26.6.5 bulletin describes. Until then, clear the TransferFiles permission on every role under Administration > Security > Roles. Pass: check 3 shows only 26.6.5.9742 or later.
  4. On a flagged host, replace <service> with the name from the sweep's Rogue column and run the block below (out-of-band). Pass: rerun check 2 and every column is empty or False. Huntress saw reinfection after isolation was lifted, so keep hosts isolated until then.
Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName TrapWatch -Confirm:$false
Remove-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run' -Name RelayTrapLiteAlert
Stop-Service -Name '<service>' -Force; sc.exe delete '<service>'
Remove-Item 'C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap' -Recurse -Force
netsh interface portproxy delete v4tov4 listenport=88 listenaddress=127.0.0.1
Remove-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess 'msiexec.exe','powershell.exe'
  1. From a clean device, revoke active ScreenConnect and identity-provider sessions and reset technician passwords. ConnectWise warns that "password resets alone do not invalidate all existing sessions." Pass: every technician is asked to sign in again.

Patching alone is not cleanup. Partners learned that with N-able N-central earlier this month.

Where KinoSec fits

The weak point was an API that accepted an empty key, and that is what an autonomous pentest checks. KinoSec maps the web apps, portals and APIs on a client's external surface, tries them as an attacker would, and writes up what it reached, with fixes. With autonomous web app and API pentesting for your clients, you can run that on demand across your portfolio and hand each client a report under your brand. It doesn't replace the endpoint sweep; it tells you which door to close next.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is ScreenConnect SCKit?

SCKit is a toolkit, found by Blackpoint Cyber and Huntress in November 2026, that installs rogue ScreenConnect clients and a fake Guest service called RelayTrap on compromised endpoints. RelayTrap tries to push a file to any technician who connects, exploiting CVE-2026-84869, then reuse the technician's session cookies. Blackpoint saw no successful spread as of November 13, 2026.

How do I check if my clients were hit by SCKit?

Use EDR or WinRM, never ScreenConnect. First, Test-Path C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap returns True on a hit. Second, Get-ScheduledTask -TaskName TrapWatch returns a task on a hit. Third, netsh interface portproxy show v4tov4 shows 185.241.211.197 on a hit. The sweep in check 2 above runs all three across a whole host list in one command.

Which ScreenConnect version fixes CVE-2026-84869?

ConnectWise fixed CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect 26.6.5, released September 8, 2026, and rated CVSS 9.9. Blackpoint gives the first fixed client build as 26.6.5.9742. Updating the server or cloud console does not update technician clients, so reinstall host clients too.

Was the RMM+ extension how attackers got in?

Huntress believes so: RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key, tracked as CVE-2026-127063. ConnectWise closed its investigation on November 16 without naming a root cause, and Blackpoint found no technical link between the extensions and SCKit, so the entry point remains unconfirmed.

Can an autonomous pentest find this kind of exposure?

An autonomous pentest such as KinoSec tests a client's web apps, portals and APIs as an attacker would, including whether an API accepts empty credentials, and reports what it reached with remediation. It complements, not replaces, the endpoint sweep above.