Your Firewall's Login Page Led Straight to a Wiper

Check Point CVE-2026-123039 lets PHP2Shell attackers take root on gateways; here's how to check and patch your clients' Check Point firewalls.

The firewall's front door had a patch for a week. The staircase from that door to root had none, and attackers took both. In some Israeli networks they then reached a VMware ESXi host behind the gateway and ran a wiper that zeroed and deleted files, leaving a political note in each folder.

TL;DR

  • What happened: Attackers used PHP2Shell to get into Check Point Mobile Access portals, then a Check Point zero-day, CVE-2026-123039, to become root, Check Point Research reported.
  • Am I exposed: Gateways on R81.20 to R82.20 running Mobile Access, SSL Network Extender, SAML VPN or other portals, below the fixed Jumbo takes in sk1000302, are exposed.
  • What to do: Preserve evidence, grep /var/log/dynamicCli.log for root commands, then install R82 Take 132 or R81.20 Take 174, per sk1000362.
  • Impact: Check Point says it saw CVE-2026-123039 exploited against "a couple of dozen customers". Some Israeli victims also had an ESXi host wiped.

What happened to Check Point gateways?

Attackers chained two bugs to take full control of Check Point gateways. Check Point Research lays out the order:

  1. Way in: PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, each CVSS 9.2), two flaws in the PHP engine behind the Mobile Access portal. This gave them the portal's low-privilege service account.
  2. Way up: CVE-2026-123039, the Check Point zero-day. A root-owned helper called DynamicCLI listens on a socket any local user can write to, and it runs whatever it is sent as root.
  3. Staying put: PHP webshells named zz*.tpl were hidden among the files the portal uses to build its login page. The TSGA backdoor (slot_CPconfigdaemon) listened on TCP port 11072, and a proxy library called TSProxy was injected into appliance processes.
  4. Moving on: A scanner called gogo mapped the internal network. The attackers then logged in to an ESXi host over SSH as vpxuser and ran a wiper named destroy_v6.

For how PHP2Shell itself works, see our PHP2Shell exploitation guide. Check Point posted its PHP2Shell hotfix on October 23, according to sk1000302. The research says the first, destructive wave began on October 30 and mostly hit Israeli organisations. A second wave across several countries began on November 2 and showed no destruction.

Who did it is unclear. Check Point says the implants belong to the PhiliKit family, which ESET has linked to the China-nexus group UNC5221, but it wrote that the evidence "does not allow us to assess with high confidence the true nature of this operation," as SecurityWeek reported.

Is CVE-2026-123039 a remote bug?

No. CVE-2026-123039 is a local privilege escalation rated 7.8 (CVSS), so on its own it needs code already running on the box. PHP2Shell supplies that code from the internet with no login. Think of a building where the lobby door was left on the latch and the lift accepts any key. Neither problem alone gets a stranger to the roof, but together they do.

Clients need both bugs closed, and both fixes ship in the same Jumbo Hotfix takes.

Am I exposed to the Check Point zero-day?

A client gateway is exposed if it runs a supported release below the fixed take and has an internet-facing portal. sk1000302 lists the PHP2Shell-exposed features: Mobile Access Portal, Remote Access VPN with SSL Network Extender, Remote Access VPN with SAML, Identity Awareness Captive Portal, UserCheck and Zero Phishing.

sk1000362 lists the CVE-2026-123039 fixes:

  • R82.20: Jumbo Hotfix Take 14 or later
  • R82.10: Take 52 or later
  • R82: Take 132 or later
  • R81.20: Take 174 or later

R81 and R81.10 are end of support and sk1000362 lists no fix for them. Spark firewalls and Smart-1 Cloud are not affected by CVE-2026-123039.

How do I check a Check Point gateway for compromise?

Run these checks in Expert mode before you patch, because the hotfix needs a reboot.

  1. Preserve evidence. Copy the DynamicCLI log, the portal session files and any implant files, then hash them:
D=/var/log/ir-$(hostname)-$(date +%F); sudo mkdir -p "$D"
sudo cp -a /var/log/dynamicCli.log* /opt/CPcvpn-*/tmp "$D"/
sudo find /tmp -maxdepth 1 \( -name .bd.log -o -name CPconfigdaemon -o -name .up.tpl \) -exec cp -a {} "$D"/ \;
sudo find "$D" -type f -exec sha256sum {} + | sudo tee "$D.sha256"
  1. Look for root commands in dynamicCli.log. These three greps come from sk1000362's compromise section. Any output needs investigating:
grep "Received =" /var/log/dynamicCli.log | grep -vF "CPprofile.sh >> /dev/null; export SP_DISTRIBUTE=0; set -o noglob;"
grep -F "Received = #return_value#" /var/log/dynamicCli.log
grep -EI "Received =.*( id;| whoami| /etc/shadow| ncat| nc -| /dev/tcp| curl | wget | base64| useradd| authorized_keys)" /var/log/dynamicCli.log
  1. Hunt the PHP2Shell marker and implant files. The first command finds portal session files containing upload_progress_pwn. The research shows them under /opt/CPcvpn-R81.20/tmp/, and the wildcard also covers other releases. The second lists the files the research names. The third prints only files that match the published SHA-256 hashes:
sudo grep -rl upload_progress_pwn /opt/CPcvpn-*/tmp/
sudo ls -la /tmp/.bd.log /tmp/.p_sock /tmp/.up.tpl /tmp/CPconfigdaemon /lib/libcpfwcommon.so
sudo find / \( -path /proc -o -path /sys \) -prune -o -type f \( -name 'zz*.tpl' -o -name 'challenge_render.tpl' -o -name '*CPconfigdaemon' -o -name gogo -o -name libdssafe.so -o -name philistine \) -print0 | sudo xargs -0 -r sha256sum | grep -iE 'edb3e92eb7bda7413a09edcc4b1ba3cbed4bcdf42808a8abce63b6e4c3fda2b3|4171b521fa6441382aa2fa014a08e18ff9a6e0ab6096c9144072bf46b37a2ec8|d7549671c7189979f0624ec52dad9ea6a707d23146e3585ab8f8c4720eca0c63|3b51080a909023f7d484e2443740b572307ce0054eb9e32d98f0a06bfcd2db90|ee16e1695711b9d60c62925fcfb2fe1a29c18ae26565bc05410a14e16d2a39d7|fb1a6235eb6bce8c9ec8cd8bb85f17c9c2bde8ecb45b7a243a30ceadf26654da'
  1. Check the TSGA backdoor's listener and running processes. This only shows processes running right now, so a reboot clears it:
sudo netstat -tlnp | grep ':11072'
ps -eo pid,ppid,user,comm,args --forest | grep -E 'httpd|CPconfigdaemon|gogo' | grep -v grep
  1. Search for the attackers' IPs. The research names 130.94.19.204 and 130.94.19.168, with scanning mostly between 00:00 and 09:00 UTC. On the gateway, search the text logs:
sudo grep -rlE '130\.94\.19\.(204|168)' /var/log 2>/dev/null
  1. Check the ESXi hosts behind the gateway. Look for SSH logins as vpxuser, the wiper and its note. Run this from an admin box with a list of hosts that have SSH enabled:
for h in $(cat esxi-hosts.txt); do echo "== $h"; ssh root@"$h" "grep -E 'sshd.*vpxuser' /var/log/auth.log; find /vmfs/volumes /tmp -name DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt -o -name 'des wiper'"; done

For a large gateway fleet, this loop runs the system() grep from check 2 and the file listing from check 3. It needs an admin account whose login shell is bash:

for h in $(cat gateways.txt); do echo "== $h"; ssh admin@"$h" 'grep -F "Received = #return_value#" /var/log/dynamicCli.log; ls -la /tmp/.bd.log /tmp/.p_sock /lib/libcpfwcommon.so 2>&1'; done

How do I fix CVE-2026-123039 and PHP2Shell on Check Point?

The fixed Jumbo Hotfix take closes both bugs.

  1. Preserve evidence with check 1 above before any reboot.
  2. Install the fixed Jumbo take from the list above across the whole cluster, then reboot. Pass condition: ls -l /tmp/dynamic_socket shows owner root, group config and srw-rw---- (0660), not world-writable, per sk1000362.
  3. If you can't patch today, stop DynamicCLI and keep it from restarting. This breaks the Dynamic CLI commands listed in sk144112. Then confirm the last command prints nothing:
dbset process:dynamic_server
dbset :save
ps auxw | grep -v grep | grep 'dynamic_server'
  1. Upgrade R81 and R81.10 gateways to R81.20 or later, then apply step 2. sk1000362 lists no fix for them.

Where KinoSec fits

This campaign started at a public web page on a firewall. Many clients don't know their gateway still exposes a Mobile Access or Captive Portal page, or that an old R81.10 box sits at a branch office. An autonomous pentest maps every client's external surface, finds those portal pages, tests what they expose and writes up what needs patching first, in a report you hand the client.

Behind the gateway, the attackers' next moves were network discovery and an SSH hop to ESXi, the same paths an internal test walks. Run autonomous internal and external network pentests for your clients with Poseidon to see how far a foothold on the edge would really get, then retest after the patch. For how PHP2Shell footholds turn into root on Linux-based firewalls, see the Fragnesia chain breakdown.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-123039?

CVE-2026-123039 is a local privilege escalation in Check Point Gaia's DynamicCLI daemon, rated 7.8 (CVSS). The daemon runs as root and accepts commands on a world-writable socket, /tmp/dynamic_socket. Attackers used it after PHP2Shell to turn a portal foothold into root on Check Point gateways.

How do I check if my clients' Check Point gateways were hit?

First, preserve /var/log/dynamicCli.log and the portal session files in a dated folder and hash them. Then run grep -F "Received = #return_value#" /var/log/dynamicCli.log, one of the three greps in sk1000362. Finally, run sudo grep -rl upload_progress_pwn /opt/CPcvpn-*/tmp/ and sudo netstat -tlnp | grep ':11072' to find the PHP2Shell marker and the TSGA backdoor's listener.

Which Jumbo Hotfix fixes the Check Point zero-day?

Per sk1000362, the fixes are R82.20 Take 14, R82.10 Take 52, R82 Take 132 and R81.20 Take 174, or later. The same takes carry the PHP2Shell fix, per sk1000302. R81 and R81.10 have no listed fix for CVE-2026-123039.