Check Point CVE-2026-123039 lets PHP2Shell attackers take root on gateways; here's how to check and patch your clients' Check Point firewalls.
The firewall's front door had a patch for a week. The staircase from that door to root had none, and attackers took both. In some Israeli networks they then reached a VMware ESXi host behind the gateway and ran a wiper that zeroed and deleted files, leaving a political note in each folder.
/var/log/dynamicCli.log for root commands, then install R82 Take 132 or R81.20 Take 174, per sk1000362.Attackers chained two bugs to take full control of Check Point gateways. Check Point Research lays out the order:
zz*.tpl were hidden among the files the portal uses to build its login page. The TSGA backdoor (slot_CPconfigdaemon) listened on TCP port 11072, and a proxy library called TSProxy was injected into appliance processes.vpxuser and ran a wiper named destroy_v6.For how PHP2Shell itself works, see our PHP2Shell exploitation guide. Check Point posted its PHP2Shell hotfix on October 23, according to sk1000302. The research says the first, destructive wave began on October 30 and mostly hit Israeli organisations. A second wave across several countries began on November 2 and showed no destruction.
Who did it is unclear. Check Point says the implants belong to the PhiliKit family, which ESET has linked to the China-nexus group UNC5221, but it wrote that the evidence "does not allow us to assess with high confidence the true nature of this operation," as SecurityWeek reported.
No. CVE-2026-123039 is a local privilege escalation rated 7.8 (CVSS), so on its own it needs code already running on the box. PHP2Shell supplies that code from the internet with no login. Think of a building where the lobby door was left on the latch and the lift accepts any key. Neither problem alone gets a stranger to the roof, but together they do.
Clients need both bugs closed, and both fixes ship in the same Jumbo Hotfix takes.
A client gateway is exposed if it runs a supported release below the fixed take and has an internet-facing portal. sk1000302 lists the PHP2Shell-exposed features: Mobile Access Portal, Remote Access VPN with SSL Network Extender, Remote Access VPN with SAML, Identity Awareness Captive Portal, UserCheck and Zero Phishing.
sk1000362 lists the CVE-2026-123039 fixes:
R81 and R81.10 are end of support and sk1000362 lists no fix for them. Spark firewalls and Smart-1 Cloud are not affected by CVE-2026-123039.
Run these checks in Expert mode before you patch, because the hotfix needs a reboot.
D=/var/log/ir-$(hostname)-$(date +%F); sudo mkdir -p "$D"
sudo cp -a /var/log/dynamicCli.log* /opt/CPcvpn-*/tmp "$D"/
sudo find /tmp -maxdepth 1 \( -name .bd.log -o -name CPconfigdaemon -o -name .up.tpl \) -exec cp -a {} "$D"/ \;
sudo find "$D" -type f -exec sha256sum {} + | sudo tee "$D.sha256"
grep "Received =" /var/log/dynamicCli.log | grep -vF "CPprofile.sh >> /dev/null; export SP_DISTRIBUTE=0; set -o noglob;"
grep -F "Received = #return_value#" /var/log/dynamicCli.log
grep -EI "Received =.*( id;| whoami| /etc/shadow| ncat| nc -| /dev/tcp| curl | wget | base64| useradd| authorized_keys)" /var/log/dynamicCli.log
upload_progress_pwn. The research shows them under /opt/CPcvpn-R81.20/tmp/, and the wildcard also covers other releases. The second lists the files the research names. The third prints only files that match the published SHA-256 hashes:sudo grep -rl upload_progress_pwn /opt/CPcvpn-*/tmp/
sudo ls -la /tmp/.bd.log /tmp/.p_sock /tmp/.up.tpl /tmp/CPconfigdaemon /lib/libcpfwcommon.so
sudo find / \( -path /proc -o -path /sys \) -prune -o -type f \( -name 'zz*.tpl' -o -name 'challenge_render.tpl' -o -name '*CPconfigdaemon' -o -name gogo -o -name libdssafe.so -o -name philistine \) -print0 | sudo xargs -0 -r sha256sum | grep -iE 'edb3e92eb7bda7413a09edcc4b1ba3cbed4bcdf42808a8abce63b6e4c3fda2b3|4171b521fa6441382aa2fa014a08e18ff9a6e0ab6096c9144072bf46b37a2ec8|d7549671c7189979f0624ec52dad9ea6a707d23146e3585ab8f8c4720eca0c63|3b51080a909023f7d484e2443740b572307ce0054eb9e32d98f0a06bfcd2db90|ee16e1695711b9d60c62925fcfb2fe1a29c18ae26565bc05410a14e16d2a39d7|fb1a6235eb6bce8c9ec8cd8bb85f17c9c2bde8ecb45b7a243a30ceadf26654da'
sudo netstat -tlnp | grep ':11072'
ps -eo pid,ppid,user,comm,args --forest | grep -E 'httpd|CPconfigdaemon|gogo' | grep -v grep
130.94.19.204 and 130.94.19.168, with scanning mostly between 00:00 and 09:00 UTC. On the gateway, search the text logs:sudo grep -rlE '130\.94\.19\.(204|168)' /var/log 2>/dev/null
vpxuser, the wiper and its note. Run this from an admin box with a list of hosts that have SSH enabled:for h in $(cat esxi-hosts.txt); do echo "== $h"; ssh root@"$h" "grep -E 'sshd.*vpxuser' /var/log/auth.log; find /vmfs/volumes /tmp -name DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt -o -name 'des wiper'"; done
For a large gateway fleet, this loop runs the system() grep from check 2 and the file listing from check 3. It needs an admin account whose login shell is bash:
for h in $(cat gateways.txt); do echo "== $h"; ssh admin@"$h" 'grep -F "Received = #return_value#" /var/log/dynamicCli.log; ls -la /tmp/.bd.log /tmp/.p_sock /lib/libcpfwcommon.so 2>&1'; done
The fixed Jumbo Hotfix take closes both bugs.
ls -l /tmp/dynamic_socket shows owner root, group config and srw-rw---- (0660), not world-writable, per sk1000362.dbset process:dynamic_server
dbset :save
ps auxw | grep -v grep | grep 'dynamic_server'
This campaign started at a public web page on a firewall. Many clients don't know their gateway still exposes a Mobile Access or Captive Portal page, or that an old R81.10 box sits at a branch office. An autonomous pentest maps every client's external surface, finds those portal pages, tests what they expose and writes up what needs patching first, in a report you hand the client.
Behind the gateway, the attackers' next moves were network discovery and an SSH hop to ESXi, the same paths an internal test walks. Run autonomous internal and external network pentests for your clients with Poseidon to see how far a foothold on the edge would really get, then retest after the patch. For how PHP2Shell footholds turn into root on Linux-based firewalls, see the Fragnesia chain breakdown.
CVE-2026-123039 is a local privilege escalation in Check Point Gaia's DynamicCLI daemon, rated 7.8 (CVSS). The daemon runs as root and accepts commands on a world-writable socket, /tmp/dynamic_socket. Attackers used it after PHP2Shell to turn a portal foothold into root on Check Point gateways.
First, preserve /var/log/dynamicCli.log and the portal session files in a dated folder and hash them. Then run grep -F "Received = #return_value#" /var/log/dynamicCli.log, one of the three greps in sk1000362. Finally, run sudo grep -rl upload_progress_pwn /opt/CPcvpn-*/tmp/ and sudo netstat -tlnp | grep ':11072' to find the PHP2Shell marker and the TSGA backdoor's listener.
Per sk1000362, the fixes are R82.20 Take 14, R82.10 Take 52, R82 Take 132 and R81.20 Take 174, or later. The same takes carry the PHP2Shell fix, per sk1000302. R81 and R81.10 have no listed fix for CVE-2026-123039.