A Five-Year-Old Bug Led Hackers to the Signing Server

VMware vCenter Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 let BO Team reach a code-signing server; here's how to check your clients' vCenter for it.

Log4Shell made headlines in December 2021, and most people filed it under "solved." Yet a Russian software developer's VMware vCenter 7.0.3 server was still exposed to it when the BO Team group moved through their network, Kaspersky ICS CERT reported on 5 November 2026. The attackers' goal was the server that signs the company's software before it ships to customers.

TL;DR

  • Kaspersky ICS CERT says BO Team got in through password-based SSH, used Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) to get root on an unpatched VMware vCenter 7.0.3, and reached a code-signing server.
  • Your clients are exposed if any vCenter runs below the fixed builds in VMware's VMSA-2021-0028, such as 7.0 U3c. The vCenter command vpxd -v prints the build.
  • Preserve evidence first. Then upgrade vCenter, turn off SSH password logins, and check hosts against the cron paths and MD5 hashes in Kaspersky's report.
  • Kaspersky says the attackers "were apparently unable to bring the attack to its intended conclusion". The report names no tampered builds, though the attackers had dumped domain credentials.

What happened in the BO Team intrusion?

BO Team spent several months inside an unnamed Russian software developer's network, and in June 2025 the company asked Kaspersky for help. Kaspersky's report lays out the chain:

  1. The front door was SSH. A Linux terminal server had SSH open to the internet, and a service account could log in with just a password. On another administrator's terminal server, the attackers guessed the root password "after approximately 2500 failed attempts."
  2. Log4Shell on vCenter. vCenter 7.0.3 still loaded a vulnerable Log4j library in its Tomcat web server. The attackers sent a Base64-encoded reverse-shell command copied from a public demo, and Kaspersky confirmed on a test bench that the build was vulnerable.
  3. From vCenter to the hypervisor. As root, they read root's private SSH key and used it to log in to the hypervisor.
  4. Quiet persistence. They planted hourly cron backdoors named to look like PostgreSQL and VMware components, with timestamps set back to 2021.
  5. Credentials everywhere. They dumped LSASS (the Windows process holding logon secrets) and ntds.dit (the domain's password database), and modified /usr/bin/nxnode-login to save users' passwords to /dev/shm/pulse-shm-3088612174.
  6. The prize. They went after a Windows server that "was used to sign compiled builds of the commercial software." Kaspersky suggests they wanted to inject code before signing or steal the certificate. Security software on that server blocked them.

The toolkit included Mythic, Cobalt Strike and GSocket, as The Hacker News lists, plus internal scans for SMB, Kerberos, LDAP and WinRM. Those are pentest tools, but this was an intrusion, not a pentest: a pentest has the owner's permission, a written scope and a report back to the owner.

Why does Log4Shell still matter in 2026?

Log4Shell still matters because appliances such as vCenter carry their own copy of Log4j, and patching the operating system never touches it. CVE-2021-44228 is rated 10.0 (CVSS), and needs no login. CISA's data in the CVE record shows it on the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list since 2021-12-10. VMware's advisory has said since 2021 that "exploitation attempts in the wild of CVE-2021-44228 have been confirmed by VMware."

Think of the one house on the street that never changed its locks after a master key leaked. That's the house burglars check. And vCenter controls every virtual machine it manages, so root on it is a short path to everything else.

Which vCenter versions are affected?

vCenter Server 7.x, 6.7.x and 6.5.x are affected below these fixed versions from VMSA-2021-0028:

vCenter branch Fixed in
7.x appliance 7.0 U3c (build 19234570)
6.7.x appliance or Windows 6.7 U3q
6.5.x appliance or Windows 6.5 U3s

How do I check whether my clients' vCenter servers are exposed or compromised?

Run steps 1–6 as root on the vCenter appliance, and use step 7 to cover the Linux servers it manages.

  1. Preserve evidence first. Copy logs and cron files before changing anything, and keep a hash list. If the appliance is short on space, set D to external storage.
D=/root/evidence-$(hostname)-$(date +%F); sudo mkdir -p "$D"
sudo cp -a /var/log/vmware /etc/cron.hourly /etc/crontab /var/spool/cron "$D"/
sudo find "$D" -type f -exec sha256sum {} + | sudo tee "$D.sha256"
  1. Read the build. Run vpxd -v (Broadcom KB 345263). On the 7.0 branch, any build below 19234570 is exposed.
  2. Match Kaspersky's hashes. This prints only files matching the MD5s in Kaspersky's indicator list. Ignore file dates, because the attackers faked them.
sudo find /etc/cron* /var/spool/cron /usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate /tmp /dev/shm -type f -exec md5sum {} + 2>/dev/null | grep -iE '346b04985ec6c5d107ba0ddf32fe7691|b86690213f0155f7b3b65832301ed932|5aa8c19c897176502cf8d8fc543fafc7|68957de915e2a58339fa477f8078bdf4|cb2908ef4cc042bfe856c84e9b61a2f9|5e04b2891635cbaa83ad619fe248e85b|719e813e527920e83349e061b5b1590f|86ff08749e77d5d078e929e5f9748504|6d12efa1db15121f88d58b9952e301ef'
  1. List cron entries, the named files and the password trap. Any output from the second or third line needs investigating.
sudo ls -la /etc/cron* /var/spool/cron/*
sudo ls -la /etc/cron.hourly/pgcache /etc/cron.hourly/1vmware-timesync /usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate /dev/shm/pulse-shm-3088612174 2>/dev/null
sudo grep -l 'pulse-shm' /usr/bin/nxnode-login 2>/dev/null
  1. Look for live shells. This prints the process tree, so a shell spawned under vCenter's Java process shows as its child, and filters to nc -e shells, GSocket and the payload Kaspersky saw running as exe. It only shows processes running now.
ps -eo pid,ppid,user,comm,args --forest | grep -E '[j]ava|[n]c -e|[g]socket|[g]s-netcat| exe( |$)'
  1. Search proxy and DNS logs on your client's proxy or DNS server for the attacker domains and IPs.
sudo grep -rhE 'nofrillsdns\.com|gsocket\.io|193\.3\.23\.236|80\.76\.42\.139|95\.81\.115\.77|dataclub\.info' /var/log/ | head -50
  1. Run steps 3, 4 and 5 fleet-wide in one loop, from a host that can SSH to every server listed in hosts.txt:
while read -r h; do ssh -n "$h" "sudo find /etc/cron* /var/spool/cron /usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate /tmp /dev/shm -type f -exec md5sum {} + 2>/dev/null | grep -iE '346b04985ec6c5d107ba0ddf32fe7691|b86690213f0155f7b3b65832301ed932|5aa8c19c897176502cf8d8fc543fafc7|68957de915e2a58339fa477f8078bdf4|cb2908ef4cc042bfe856c84e9b61a2f9|5e04b2891635cbaa83ad619fe248e85b|719e813e527920e83349e061b5b1590f|86ff08749e77d5d078e929e5f9748504|6d12efa1db15121f88d58b9952e301ef'; sudo ls -la /etc/cron* /var/spool/cron/*; sudo ls -la /etc/cron.hourly/pgcache /etc/cron.hourly/1vmware-timesync /usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate /dev/shm/pulse-shm-3088612174 2>/dev/null; sudo grep -l 'pulse-shm' /usr/bin/nxnode-login 2>/dev/null; ps -eo pid,ppid,user,comm,args --forest | grep -E '[j]ava|[n]c -e|[g]socket|[g]s-netcat| exe( |\$)'" | sed "s/^/$h: /"; done < hosts.txt

How do I fix it?

  1. Preserve evidence (check step 1) before any change.
  2. Upgrade vCenter to 7.0 U3c or later, then run vpxd -v and confirm the build is 19234570 or higher. If you can't upgrade yet, run vc_log4j_mitigator.py exactly as Broadcom KB 318925 describes; Broadcom calls it temporary and says not to run it on 7.0 U3c or later.
  3. Turn off SSH passwords. Set PasswordAuthentication no and PermitRootLogin no in /etc/ssh/sshd_config, then run sudo systemctl reload sshd. Pass check: ssh -o PubkeyAuthentication=no user@host fails with "Permission denied (publickey)".
  4. If any hash matched, rotate Kerberos. Reset the krbtgt password in Active Directory Users and Computers (View → Advanced Features → Users → krbtgt → Reset Password), per Microsoft's guide: twice, 10 hours apart. Pass check: Get-ADUser krbtgt -Properties PasswordLastSet shows the second reset's date.

Intruders who reach vCenter often go further: see how attackers hide inside ESXi hosts once they hold vCenter, and another way exposed SSH lets attackers in.

Where KinoSec fits

This chain is built from exactly what a network pentest exists to find: SSH taking passwords from the internet, a management server still open to a 2021 bug, and a flat network where one root shell reaches the hypervisor and the domain. KinoSec runs the same reconnaissance and exploit chaining, with your client's permission, inside agreed scope limits, and ends with a report they can act on. With autonomous internal and external network pentesting through Poseidon, you can check every client's SSH exposure, vCenter and Active Directory continuously, not once a year.

Frequently Asked Questions

How do I check if my clients were hit by BO Team?

Hash cron files with find /etc/cron* -type f -exec md5sum {} + and grep for Kaspersky's MD5s (full command above). List planted files with ls -la /etc/cron.hourly/pgcache /dev/shm/pulse-shm-*. Search proxy logs with grep -rE 'nofrillsdns\.com' /var/log/.

Is Log4Shell still exploited in 2026?

Yes. Kaspersky ICS CERT reported on 5 November 2026 that BO Team used CVE-2021-44228 against a VMware vCenter 7.0.3 server during an intrusion the victim reported in June 2025. CVE-2021-44228 has been on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list since 2021-12-10.

Which vCenter version fixes Log4Shell?

VMware's VMSA-2021-0028 lists vCenter 7.0 U3c (build 19234570), 6.7 U3q and 6.5 U3s as fixed. Run vpxd -v on the appliance as root to read the installed build.

Did BO Team tamper with signed software?

Kaspersky's report names no tampered builds. It says the attackers "were apparently unable to bring the attack to its intended conclusion", and that security software on the signing server blocked their attempts.

Can an autonomous pentest find this kind of exposure?

Yes. An autonomous network pentest such as KinoSec's Poseidon looks for internet-facing SSH, vulnerable management servers like vCenter, and paths from one compromised host into Active Directory, then reports them with remediation.