VMware vCenter Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 let BO Team reach a code-signing server; here's how to check your clients' vCenter for it.
Log4Shell made headlines in December 2021, and most people filed it under "solved." Yet a Russian software developer's VMware vCenter 7.0.3 server was still exposed to it when the BO Team group moved through their network, Kaspersky ICS CERT reported on 5 November 2026. The attackers' goal was the server that signs the company's software before it ships to customers.
vpxd -v prints the build.BO Team spent several months inside an unnamed Russian software developer's network, and in June 2025 the company asked Kaspersky for help. Kaspersky's report lays out the chain:
ntds.dit (the domain's password database), and modified /usr/bin/nxnode-login to save users' passwords to /dev/shm/pulse-shm-3088612174.The toolkit included Mythic, Cobalt Strike and GSocket, as The Hacker News lists, plus internal scans for SMB, Kerberos, LDAP and WinRM. Those are pentest tools, but this was an intrusion, not a pentest: a pentest has the owner's permission, a written scope and a report back to the owner.
Log4Shell still matters because appliances such as vCenter carry their own copy of Log4j, and patching the operating system never touches it. CVE-2021-44228 is rated 10.0 (CVSS), and needs no login. CISA's data in the CVE record shows it on the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list since 2021-12-10. VMware's advisory has said since 2021 that "exploitation attempts in the wild of CVE-2021-44228 have been confirmed by VMware."
Think of the one house on the street that never changed its locks after a master key leaked. That's the house burglars check. And vCenter controls every virtual machine it manages, so root on it is a short path to everything else.
vCenter Server 7.x, 6.7.x and 6.5.x are affected below these fixed versions from VMSA-2021-0028:
| vCenter branch | Fixed in |
|---|---|
| 7.x appliance | 7.0 U3c (build 19234570) |
| 6.7.x appliance or Windows | 6.7 U3q |
| 6.5.x appliance or Windows | 6.5 U3s |
Run steps 1–6 as root on the vCenter appliance, and use step 7 to cover the Linux servers it manages.
D to external storage.D=/root/evidence-$(hostname)-$(date +%F); sudo mkdir -p "$D"
sudo cp -a /var/log/vmware /etc/cron.hourly /etc/crontab /var/spool/cron "$D"/
sudo find "$D" -type f -exec sha256sum {} + | sudo tee "$D.sha256"
vpxd -v (Broadcom KB 345263). On the 7.0 branch, any build below 19234570 is exposed.sudo find /etc/cron* /var/spool/cron /usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate /tmp /dev/shm -type f -exec md5sum {} + 2>/dev/null | grep -iE '346b04985ec6c5d107ba0ddf32fe7691|b86690213f0155f7b3b65832301ed932|5aa8c19c897176502cf8d8fc543fafc7|68957de915e2a58339fa477f8078bdf4|cb2908ef4cc042bfe856c84e9b61a2f9|5e04b2891635cbaa83ad619fe248e85b|719e813e527920e83349e061b5b1590f|86ff08749e77d5d078e929e5f9748504|6d12efa1db15121f88d58b9952e301ef'
sudo ls -la /etc/cron* /var/spool/cron/*
sudo ls -la /etc/cron.hourly/pgcache /etc/cron.hourly/1vmware-timesync /usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate /dev/shm/pulse-shm-3088612174 2>/dev/null
sudo grep -l 'pulse-shm' /usr/bin/nxnode-login 2>/dev/null
nc -e shells, GSocket and the payload Kaspersky saw running as exe. It only shows processes running now.ps -eo pid,ppid,user,comm,args --forest | grep -E '[j]ava|[n]c -e|[g]socket|[g]s-netcat| exe( |$)'
sudo grep -rhE 'nofrillsdns\.com|gsocket\.io|193\.3\.23\.236|80\.76\.42\.139|95\.81\.115\.77|dataclub\.info' /var/log/ | head -50
hosts.txt:while read -r h; do ssh -n "$h" "sudo find /etc/cron* /var/spool/cron /usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate /tmp /dev/shm -type f -exec md5sum {} + 2>/dev/null | grep -iE '346b04985ec6c5d107ba0ddf32fe7691|b86690213f0155f7b3b65832301ed932|5aa8c19c897176502cf8d8fc543fafc7|68957de915e2a58339fa477f8078bdf4|cb2908ef4cc042bfe856c84e9b61a2f9|5e04b2891635cbaa83ad619fe248e85b|719e813e527920e83349e061b5b1590f|86ff08749e77d5d078e929e5f9748504|6d12efa1db15121f88d58b9952e301ef'; sudo ls -la /etc/cron* /var/spool/cron/*; sudo ls -la /etc/cron.hourly/pgcache /etc/cron.hourly/1vmware-timesync /usr/bin/vmware-toolbox-setdate /dev/shm/pulse-shm-3088612174 2>/dev/null; sudo grep -l 'pulse-shm' /usr/bin/nxnode-login 2>/dev/null; ps -eo pid,ppid,user,comm,args --forest | grep -E '[j]ava|[n]c -e|[g]socket|[g]s-netcat| exe( |\$)'" | sed "s/^/$h: /"; done < hosts.txt
vpxd -v and confirm the build is 19234570 or higher. If you can't upgrade yet, run vc_log4j_mitigator.py exactly as Broadcom KB 318925 describes; Broadcom calls it temporary and says not to run it on 7.0 U3c or later.PasswordAuthentication no and PermitRootLogin no in /etc/ssh/sshd_config, then run sudo systemctl reload sshd. Pass check: ssh -o PubkeyAuthentication=no user@host fails with "Permission denied (publickey)".krbtgt password in Active Directory Users and Computers (View → Advanced Features → Users → krbtgt → Reset Password), per Microsoft's guide: twice, 10 hours apart. Pass check: Get-ADUser krbtgt -Properties PasswordLastSet shows the second reset's date.Intruders who reach vCenter often go further: see how attackers hide inside ESXi hosts once they hold vCenter, and another way exposed SSH lets attackers in.
This chain is built from exactly what a network pentest exists to find: SSH taking passwords from the internet, a management server still open to a 2021 bug, and a flat network where one root shell reaches the hypervisor and the domain. KinoSec runs the same reconnaissance and exploit chaining, with your client's permission, inside agreed scope limits, and ends with a report they can act on. With autonomous internal and external network pentesting through Poseidon, you can check every client's SSH exposure, vCenter and Active Directory continuously, not once a year.
Hash cron files with find /etc/cron* -type f -exec md5sum {} + and grep for Kaspersky's MD5s (full command above). List planted files with ls -la /etc/cron.hourly/pgcache /dev/shm/pulse-shm-*. Search proxy logs with grep -rE 'nofrillsdns\.com' /var/log/.
Yes. Kaspersky ICS CERT reported on 5 November 2026 that BO Team used CVE-2021-44228 against a VMware vCenter 7.0.3 server during an intrusion the victim reported in June 2025. CVE-2021-44228 has been on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list since 2021-12-10.
VMware's VMSA-2021-0028 lists vCenter 7.0 U3c (build 19234570), 6.7 U3q and 6.5 U3s as fixed. Run vpxd -v on the appliance as root to read the installed build.
Kaspersky's report names no tampered builds. It says the attackers "were apparently unable to bring the attack to its intended conclusion", and that security software on the signing server blocked their attempts.
Yes. An autonomous network pentest such as KinoSec's Poseidon looks for internet-facing SSH, vulnerable management servers like vCenter, and paths from one compromised host into Active Directory, then reports them with remediation.