The 2024 iPhone Bug That Still Works on Old Phones

Apple WebKit CVE-2024-27834 lets attackers finish a zero-click iPhone chain; here's how to find exposed devices on your clients' Apple fleets.

Apple fixed this bug in May 2024, and in November 2026 it is still helping someone break into iPhones. The phones it works on have one thing in common: nobody updated them. The infection didn't need a phishing email either. In one case it rode in on an ordinary website analytics script.

TL;DR

  • What happened: CISA added CVE-2024-27834, an Apple WebKit pointer authentication bypass, to CISA KEV on 4 November 2026. Sekoia ties the campaign to APT29 with moderate to high confidence.
  • Am I exposed? Only devices behind on updates. Sekoia's chain for this bug targets iOS 16.7 and may work from iOS 16.0 to 17.4. Apple's fix is in iOS 17.5 and iOS 16.7.8.
  • What to do: Update every client iPhone, iPad and Mac, hunt DNS and proxy logs for Sekoia's domains, and check client websites for injected scripts.
  • Impact: On older iPhones the chain steals browser cookies. A second chain against iOS 18.5 grabs messages, Keychain and photos, per Sekoia.

What is CVE-2024-27834?

CVE-2024-27834 is a WebKit flaw that lets an attacker who can already read and write memory get past Pointer Authentication (PAC). PAC is a hardware lock on Apple chips that signs pointers so memory tricks can't simply steer the code wherever they like. Apple's iOS 17.5 notes say "an attacker with arbitrary read and write capability may be able to bypass Pointer Authentication". They credit Manfred Paul working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative, who demonstrated it as a zero-day at Pwn2Own Vancouver in March 2024.

On its own the bug is a second stage, which is why NVD lists it at 5.5 (CVSS), with a local attack vector. Think of it as a skeleton key for the inner door. It's useless until someone has already got through the front door, and in this campaign the front door is a separate WebKit remote code execution bug.

The fixed versions are iOS 17.5 and iPadOS 17.5, iOS 16.7.8 and iPadOS 16.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.5, Safari 17.5, tvOS 17.5 and watchOS 10.5.

How is CVE-2024-27834 being exploited?

CVE-2024-27834 is being exploited as part of a zero-click watering-hole campaign. Victims only have to load a booby-trapped web page. Sekoia's report describes three exploit chains, all built from bugs that were already patched:

  • Class A (iOS 16.7): CVE-2025-43529 for code execution in WebKit, then CVE-2024-27834 to defeat PAC, then cookie theft.
  • Class B (iOS 18.5): a longer chain using a suspected commercial kit Sekoia calls DarkSword. It harvests messages, Keychain, photos and location data.
  • Class C (Android Chrome 139–145, excluding 143): steals Chrome cookies, saved logins and Wi-Fi passwords.

Before any exploit fires, a fingerprinting script Sekoia calls UltimateFingerprinter profiles the visitor with 394 JSON fields. That is how the chain picks which exploit to serve.

The Plerdy SEO Tracker supply-chain angle

Sekoia found three routes in: hacked legitimate websites, fake lookalike sites, and a compromise of the Plerdy SEO Tracker. From 27 August to 3 September 2026, a.plerdy[.]com/public/js/click/main.js pulled in a loader from edge-ord.clouds-stacks[.]com. Sekoia says that tracker is loaded by thousands of websites, mostly Ukrainian, including military sites. The lookalike sites included america250[.]holiday, which imitated the US 250th-anniversary site.

Is APT29 really behind it?

Sekoia attributes the campaign to APT29 (Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard) with moderate to high confidence, which is a strong lead but not proof. The Hacker News notes that APT29 is linked to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service. Neither Apple nor CISA has published an attribution or a victim count, and Security Affairs reports an 18 November 2026 patch deadline for US federal agencies.

How do I check if my clients are exposed to CVE-2024-27834?

Check whether any client device is behind on updates, any client network contacted Sekoia's infrastructure, or any client website carries the injected scripts. Work through these in order:

  1. Preserve evidence first. On every Linux web server and resolver you manage, copy the web root and logs before changing anything, then hash the copy:
D=/root/evidence-cve-2024-27834-$(date +%F); sudo mkdir -p "$D"
sudo cp -a /var/www /var/log "$D"/
sudo find "$D" -type f -exec sha256sum {} + | sudo tee "$D.sha256"
  1. Find old Apple devices. Export your MDM's device inventory as CSV, then list every device on iOS or iPadOS 16.0–16.7.7 or 17.0–17.4.x. The pattern matches the version wherever the column sits:
cat > old-ios.txt <<'EOF'
,"?(16\.([0-6](\.[0-9]+)?|7(\.[0-7])?)|17\.[0-4](\.[0-9]+)?)"?,
EOF
grep -Ef old-ios.txt devices.csv

Treat anything on iOS 18.5 as exposed to the Class B chain as well. On a single phone, the version is under Settings > General > About > iOS Version.

  1. Hunt Sekoia's domains and IPs in DNS and proxy logs. Run this on Linux resolvers, proxies and log hosts (it searches /var/log on that machine only, including rotated .gz files):
cat > ioc.txt <<'EOF'
flux-telemetry\.com
clouds-stacks\.com
starx-net\.com
adsprism-stat\.com
ads-it-assets\.com
adv-static\.com
wpvortex-mod\.com
assets-int\.com
america250\.holiday
theowo\.club
109\.104\.106\.107
95\.133\.231\.28
195\.58\.140\.105
192\.121\.46\.25
188\.190\.17\.232
EOF
sudo find /var/log -type f -exec zgrep -liEf ioc.txt {} +

No output means no hits on that host. Any filename printed is an incident. Keep it, and match device IPs to users.

  1. Check client websites for the scripts. Put client URLs in client-sites.txt and scan the HTML each one serves:
while read -r u; do printf '%s: ' "$u"; curl -sL "$u" | grep -ioE 'a\.plerdy\.com|clouds-stacks\.com|flux-telemetry\.com' | sort -u | tr '\n' ' '; echo; done < client-sites.txt

Then search the server-side templates, since Sekoia saw JavaScript injected into site templates and libraries. This loops over hosts listed in hosts.txt:

while read -r h; do echo "== $h"; ssh -n "$h" "sudo grep -rEl 'clouds-stacks|flux-telemetry|starx-net' /var/www"; done < hosts.txt

A Plerdy tag today is not an infection. It means the site's visitors could have been served the loader between 27 August and 3 September 2026.

How do I fix it?

  1. Preserve evidence from step 1 above before removing anything.
  2. Update the devices your MDM search found to the newest iOS, iPadOS or macOS Apple offers for them. The pass condition is that Settings > General > Software Update reports the software is up to date and that the step 2 search returns no rows on a fresh export.
  3. Block the IOC list at your DNS filter. The pass condition is that nslookup static.flux-telemetry.com returns your block address.
  4. Remove injected script lines that the template search found, and remove third-party tags the client no longer uses. Then rerun step 4 and confirm it prints nothing.

Where KinoSec fits

KinoSec won't patch phones. But this campaign worked because of something partners see all the time: old fixes that drop off the list, and client websites loading code nobody reviews. KinoSec runs an autonomous pentest of your clients' web apps and external networks. It handles the reconnaissance, finds the vulnerabilities, chains exploits across those surfaces and writes up each finding with remediation. You run it continuously, so an old, "Medium" issue on a client's external surface stays in the report you hand your client until it's fixed.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is CVE-2024-27834 being exploited in the wild?

Yes. CISA added CVE-2024-27834 to CISA KEV on 4 November 2026, based on evidence of active exploitation. Sekoia links the exploitation to APT29 with moderate to high confidence, in a watering-hole campaign against unpatched iPhones.

Which iOS version fixes CVE-2024-27834?

Apple fixed CVE-2024-27834 in iOS 17.5 and iOS 16.7.8, released 13 May 2024. The fix is also in iPadOS 17.5 and 16.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.5, Safari 17.5, tvOS 17.5 and watchOS 10.5. Devices on any of these versions or later are not exposed to this bug.

How do I check if my clients were hit by the APT29 watering-hole campaign?

First, preserve evidence, then list old devices from an MDM CSV export with grep -Ef old-ios.txt devices.csv, using the pattern file from step 2 above. Next, search DNS and proxy logs for Sekoia's domains and IPs with sudo find /var/log -type f -exec zgrep -liEf ioc.txt {} +. Finally, scan web roots with sudo grep -rEl 'clouds-stacks|flux-telemetry|starx-net' /var/www.

What was the Plerdy SEO Tracker compromise?

According to Sekoia, the Plerdy SEO Tracker script at a.plerdy[.]com loaded a malicious loader from 27 August to 3 September 2026. Sekoia says thousands of mostly Ukrainian websites load that tracker. Visitors to those sites during that window could have been profiled and served the exploit chain.